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Abstract 
In today’s business environment, the trend towards more product variety and customization is unbroken. Due to this development, the need of 
agile and reconfigurable production systems emerged to cope with various products and product families. To design and optimize production
systems as well as to choose the optimal product matches, product analysis methods are needed. Indeed, most of the known methods aim to 
analyze a product or one product family on the physical level. Different product families, however, may differ largely in terms of the number and 
nature of components. This fact impedes an efficient comparison and choice of appropriate product family combinations for the production
system. A new methodology is proposed to analyze existing products in view of their functional and physical architecture. The aim is to cluster
these products in new assembly oriented product families for the optimization of existing assembly lines and the creation of future reconfigurable 
assembly systems. Based on Datum Flow Chain, the physical structure of the products is analyzed. Functional subassemblies are identified, and 
a functional analysis is performed. Moreover, a hybrid functional and physical architecture graph (HyFPAG) is the output which depicts the 
similarity between product families by providing design support to both, production system planners and product designers. An illustrative
example of a nail-clipper is used to explain the proposed methodology. An industrial case study on two product families of steering columns of 
thyssenkrupp Presta France is then carried out to give a first industrial evaluation of the proposed approach. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the fast development in the domain of 
communication and an ongoing trend of digitization and
digitalization, manufacturing enterprises are facing important
challenges in today’s market environments: a continuing
tendency towards reduction of product development times and
shortened product lifecycles. In addition, there is an increasing
demand of customization, being at the same time in a global 
competition with competitors all over the world. This trend, 
which is inducing the development from macro to micro 
markets, results in diminished lot sizes due to augmenting
product varieties (high-volume to low-volume production) [1]. 
To cope with this augmenting variety as well as to be able to
identify possible optimization potentials in the existing
production system, it is important to have a precise knowledge
of the product range and characteristics manufactured and/or 
assembled in this system. In this context, the main challenge in
modelling and analysis is now not only to cope with single 
products, a limited product range or existing product families,
but also to be able to analyze and to compare products to define
new product families. It can be observed that classical existing
product families are regrouped in function of clients or features.
However, assembly oriented product families are hardly to find. 
On the product family level, products differ mainly in two
main characteristics: (i) the number of components and (ii) the
type of components (e.g. mechanical, electrical, electronical). 
Classical methodologies considering mainly single products 
or solitary, already existing product families analyze the
product structure on a physical level (components level) which 
causes difficulties regarding an efficient definition and
comparison of different product families. Addressing this 
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Abstract 
The number of studies concerning outcome-based contracts (OBCs) has gradually increased over the past decade, with a focus on servitizing 
companies. The mutually beneficial baseline logic behind such contracting provides a fascinating area for research because, for instance, it 
facilitates overcoming the service paradox through network-driven value co-creation. In addition to contractual techniques, the digitization of 
services in product-service systems (PSS) has gained attention as the enabler of the given business models. We set out to research OBCs that 
are based on econom c value (eOBCs) in the energy technology sector. We apped the ecosystem surrounding IPP-provider contract 
re ationships and found that the outcome  sold ultimately consist of value propositions made to serve economic outcomes that subsume 
availability guaran ees, which subsequently s bsu e performance. The depiction of th valu  system serves as a basis n whic  to develop 
future findings concerning practices comprising the outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past decade, research concerning performance- 
or outcome-based contracts (PBCs or OBCs) has rapidly 
increased in number [1, 2, 3]. Despite the academic 
abundance, the terminology used to describe the phenomenon 
lacks cohesion [4, 5]. Some authors refer to the overarching 
phenomenon as OBCs [6, 7], while others use the term PBCs 
[8, 9, 10]. 
Despite the variation in the terminology used, scholars 
agree that the conjunctive factor of outcome-based contracting 
is the payment, which, in this context, refers to the revenue 
generation logic. By definition, OBCs represent a means for 
contracting wherein a customer is obliged to pay only when 
the provider has delivered the outcome agreed upon [11]. 
Recently, the OBC concept has been challenged in a way 
that questions the existence of OBCs that are established to 
provide economic results (eOBCs [12]). Grubic and Jennions 
[4] argue that most OBCs are bound to outcome attributes that 
relat  to availability (aOBCs). The authors conclude that the 
only case plausibly matching their definition of eOBC is the 
renowned ‘Power by the Hour®’ contracts of Rolls-Royce. 
However, the authors argue that, from the remote monitoring 
technology (RMT) perspective, eOBCs are not feasible, even 
in the case of ‘Power by the Hour®’. 
We set out to investigate the validity of the claim of the 
inexistence of eOBCs. In the energy technology sector, the 
societal and environmental issues and economic potential of 
flexible power generation have caused alternative power 
generation methods to emerge concurrently with new agents in 
the value chain [13]. These so-called independent power 
producers (IPPs) usually invest in renewable energy 
production, such as wind or solar power [14]. In cooperation 
with public utilities and industrial solution providers, IPPs 
theoretically form a triadic hub for cleaner energy production 
networks. 
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1. Introduction 
D ring the past decade, research c ncerning performance-
or outcome-based contracts (PBCs or OBCs) has rapidly
increased in nu ber [1, 2, 3]. Despite the acad mic
abundanc , the terminol gy used to describe the phenomenon
lacks cohesion [4, 5]. Some authors refer to the overarching
phenomenon as OBCs [6, 7], while others use the term PBCs 
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that questi s the existenc  of OBCs that are established to
provide economic results (eOBCs [12]). Grubic and Jennions 
[4] argue th t most OBCs are bound to outcome attributes that
relate to availability ( OBCs). The authors conclude that
only case plausibly matching their definition of eOBC is the
renown d ‘Power by the Hour®’ con racts of Rolls-R yce.
However, the authors argue that, from the remot  monitoring
tec nology (RMT) perspective, eOBCs are not feasible, even 
in the case f ‘P wer by the Hour®’. 
We set out to investigate th  validi y of the claim of
inexistence of eOBCs. In the energy t h logy sector, the
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fl xible power generation have caused alter ative power
gener tion methods to emerge concurrently with new agents in
the value chain [13]. These so-called independent power
ers (IPPs) usually invest in renewable nergy
production, s ch as wi or solar power [14]. In cooperation
with public utilities an  industrial solution providers, IPPs
theoretically form a triadic hub for cleaner energy production 
networks. 
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To investigate the assumption of the existence of eOBCs in 
the given network context, we interviewed managers from the 
industry, building upon the framework presented by 
Kohtamäki et al. [15] depicting the interplay of macro/micro 
environments of practices in the value system of a servitized 
ecosystem. As the concept of IPP is fundamentally connected 
to economic value, it thus provides a relevant setting for 
mapping the ecosystem of eOBCs in practice. 
Furthermore, the value chain of the interconnected network 
regarding the mentioned triad most likely necessitates the 
presence of multiple OBC-related, service-intensive 
phenomena, such as advanced services [16, 17], result-
oriented product-service systems [18], performance-based 
logistics [19] and PBCs [8]. In total, the value chain thus 
creates interorganizational value through reliable performance, 
availability, and, ultimately, economic results. The given 
aspects are addressed through our research question: Why and 
how should the servitizing providers in the energy technology 
sector utilize eOBCs? 
To ensure the focal scrutinization and the depth of analysis, 
we chose to conduct a single case study in an international 
manufacturing company (Company Alpha) operating in the 
energy technology industry. Additionally, the case company 
has had an accomplished history in intensive service 
operations, such as operation and maintenance agreements 
(O&Ms). We researched a dataset constituting 30 managerial 
interviews related to the company’s service business. The 
interviewees held various positions, ranging from project 
managers to vice presidents and general managers. The dataset 
used contained 1754 minutes of recorded interviews, which 
were transcribed into almost 450 pages of text (Times New 
Roman 12, single space, 2.54 margins all around). 
Accordingly, the case evidence provided valid and consistent 
evidence for our conclusions. The lens through which we set 
out to investigate the data was established through a literature 
review focusing on outcome-based business models (OBMs) 
and contracts and the risks and value drivers associated with 
them. Additionally, the concept of IPPs was reviewed. 
2. Literature review 
The literature concerning OBCs strongly relies on case 
studies describing the nature of the contracts among their 
constituents [16, 17, 20]. According to Ng, Ding and Yip [2], 
the connecting factor of the given contracts is the mutual 
mission towards achieving an outcome. The vessel through 
which the given outcome value is created and delivered is 
embodied by the OBM. Thus, the literature review assessed 
the challenges of OBMs (i.e., risks), the incentives of OBMs 
(value drivers) and the concept of IPPs, and how they fit into 
the concept of an OBM triad in the energy technology 
industry. 
2.1. Risks 
Essentially, OBMs are executed through a risk transfer. 
The asymmetry of the risks between constituents allows the 
provider side to enjoy marginal gains [21], but on the other 
hand, it also simultaneously exposes the providers to the risk 
of not achieving the outcome or performance agreed upon. 
Conclusively, the payment methods must address 
performance with regard to both penalties and rewards [17, 2]. 
Furthermore, the risks associated with OBCs are linked to 
both context-related and stakeholder-related issues, with some 
issues more closely connected to economic risks, while others 
are more closely connected to operational risks [5]. The 
context-related risk factors are, in an overarching manner, 
categorized as complexity and dynamism, while the 
stakeholder-related risk factors constitute capability, 
alignment and dependency themes [5]. The interplay of the 
context and stakeholder-related risks necessitates the 
investigation of social exchange in the OBM context, as 
Kleeman and Essig proposed [8]. Additionally, the identified 
risk factors call for further cross-referential research. 
2.2.  Value drivers 
The reconfiguration of the risk structure in OBMs will 
allow new value drivers to emerge. Value drivers are defined 
as variables with a positive impact on the overall value 
creation connected to a business model [22]. First, as the 
focus shifts from individual actions to the outcome attributes, 
the customer companies engaged in the network may enjoy 
the benefit of using multiple services concurrently through the 
provider’s vertical and/or horizontal integration of activities in 
the value system, causing a relative complementarity of 
services [23]. In effect, the mentioned shift would apply to 
power generation through the providers’ increased operational 
responsibilities, such as in O&Ms. 
Second, customer lock-in is regarded as a value driver for 
OBMs in the sense that long-term contracts result in 
warranted and predictable value for investment and recurring 
revenues [23] for both providers and investors. Additionally, 
the long-termism allows providers to pursue cost optimization 
activities, driving marginal gains [21]. Therefore, the lock-in, 
as a value driver, is directly linked to efficiency as the third 
value driver associated with OBMs. Expanded access to the 
product-service systems [18] and the broader mandate of the 
outcome provider reduces conflicts and delays caused by 
disunity [23]. 
Accompanying the expanded mandate is the asymmetry of 
accountability, which is the fourth value driver of OBMs. The 
outcome provider therefore accepts that new operational risks 
and liabilities, which previously belonged to the customer, are 
assigned to their account. However, the shift on the risk scale 
acts as a vessel, making it in the provider’s best interest to 
assess and act upon metrics that alert them about errors [23, 
21]. 
While transitioning to an OBM, service companies also 
engage in open business models in the sense that their reliance 
on partner/supplier ability to create new activities out of their 
own scope of competences increases [7]. Hence, novelty, as a 
value driver, concerns the possible Schumpeterian rents to be 
achieved through the creation of entirely new means of value 
creation, which may decimate the preceding means [24]. 
Visnjic et al. recognized three reasons why novelty may act as 
a value driver related to the long-termism of OBCs: it 
facilitates procedural and mutual strategic learning and 
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enables the use of case-relevant lifecycle data. Additionally, 
the reallocated accountability allows trial and error to be more 
flexible in comparison to traditional product business models 
[23]. 
2.3. Independent Power Producers 
Due to the reliable power grid’s crucially positive effects 
on economic development [25, 26], many economies, 
especially developing economies, have turned to the private 
sector to ensure financial and operational support for their 
public utilities. The reason for the reform, for instance, in sub-
Saharan African countries or India [27, 28], is that many of 
these economies are excessively in debt, and thus, their 
abilities to source capital funds may be restricted. The private 
investment here refers to IPPs. The IPPs represent a model 
that originally emerged in the 1970s in the industrialized 
world [14] and currently grows, for instance, in the United 
States. The IPP model is advanced by policies allowing the 
functional unbundling of transmission operations that enable 
drastic increases in renewable energy capacity through IPPs’ 
access to transmission grids that were previously governed by 
vertically integrated utilities [29], which emphasizes the 
importance of policies and their effect on IPP incentives. 
Green et al. [21] argued that a servitization model of 
offering outcomes through integrated solutions is applicable 
in closed systems with low variety and objective measures. 
However, to pursue OBCs in higher variety, open systems, the 
development of capabilities related to customer autonomy 
management has been regarded as imperative [11]. As power 
generation assuredly is a high variety, open system, although 
with relatively objective measures, it forms an interesting 
setting in which to investigate the value system nuances and 
their meaning for the interplay of micro/ macro environments. 
3. Empirical results and discussion 
3.1. Company Alpha and IPPs 
Company Alpha’s interviewees held positions ranging 
from lower level managerial positions to vice presidents and 
general managers who were connected to the service offerings 
of their company. The interview questions concerned business 
models, value propositions and customer expectations 
regarding the scope of service offerings. When asked about 
the value propositions for different customer segments, the 
concept of IPPs was clearly demonstrated by the interviewees, 
as is presented in Table 1, in addition to the mutual value 
drivers and the logic behind operating such a business model. 
3.2. The balance of risks and value drivers 
The interview data presented in Table 2 rather elaborately 
demonstrate the context-related risks of complexity and 
dynamicity, which is in alignment with the results presented 
by Hou and Neely [5]. However, stakeholder-related risks, on 
the other hand, can be considered effectively mitigated in the 
case of the IPP-provider relationship. Accordingly, 
stakeholder-related risks include capability issues, such as 
providers’ lack of capabilities to contract or deliver, the 
internal incoherence and/or resistance of the provider, and 
customers’ inability to fulfill their part of the contract [5]. In 
the Alpha-IPP relationship, these dimensions of stakeholder-
related risks can be considered relatively well mitigated based 
on the case evidence. 
 Table 1. Company Alpha & IPPs 
Representative Quotations  
 “Some customers do not want to do anything else other than 
cover the financial side and leave the operation of the plant to 
us.” 
 “The group that is the most interested in our O&M services are 
these kinds of new players in the energy markets who we call 
IPPs, independent power producer customers. So, they can be 
investment firms that may not have the knowhow of the details 
of energy markets but regard it as a good investment that could 
pay itself back in, well, a couple of years.” 
IPPs “In the energy segment there is the fact that you don’t always 
need to acquire it, there are these so-called IPPs, which stands 
for independent power producers. That means that someone 
invests in that facility and establishes a power purchase 
agreement with utilities. In addition, they sell electricity for 
them for fifteen years, but they outsource the operations to 
Alpha.” 
 “And, of course, we have a lot of these arrangements where we 
have the operation and maintenance agreement with the 
customer, meaning that we run that system. So, there, it is in 
our own interest to perform these assignments and actions so 
that the performance remains on the desired level.” 
Table 2. Context-related risks from Alpha’s perspective 
Representative Quotations  
Complexity 
“Because the problem with these is always how do we 
measure and how to agree about the measures and how 
undisputed are the indicators, things like this. So, it’s not 
easy.” 
“And you need to remember that, when you are talking about 
power plant business, the deals are not closed in days or 
weeks. Instead, we are talking about, well, from the first 
contact, if it goes quickly, it’s a year. Sometimes it can take 
three, four or five years. You need to find the money-men; you 
must consider different permissions, environmental 
permissions especially. You need to think about power 
purchasing agreements; does the end-customer even have the 
authorization to dispatch the electricity and at what cost.” 
Dynamicity 
“And then, there are these IPPs, independent power producers, 
that are investors looking for investees here. So, our value 
proposition is an outcome of a massive calculative function. If 
you think about that, the prices in the market change every 
five minutes; we have then taken all the prices for the last five 
years. That’s 104,000 prices per year. And then, there are the 
service prices, like frequency control or these kinds of grid 
support services, so their prices. So that’s well over half a 
million input cells counting in excel. And that is then 
optimized every five minutes, that’s what should be done with 
facility. So, it’s historical data-based calculations.” 
“So, based on the forecasts that you can input for gas prices 
and such, you can estimate how much profit he will generate. 
Then, with these, these calculations are the essential building 
blocks for creating our value proposition, through which we 
can say, hey look, by doing this and this, you would earn this 
much.” 
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However, other stakeholder-related risk schemes also seem 
to apply in the case of Alpha-IPP relationships. For instance, 
stakeholder alignment remains uneven in a sense, although it 
is driven by the same performance incentives, reducing 
discrepancies in terms of goals and visions (i.e., value 
drivers). Therefore, the IPPs and their lenders retain greater 
financial power, supporting their bargaining power, as 
demonstrated by an Alpha interviewee quote in Table 3. 
Furthermore, while the providers may have the capabilities to 
operate such a model themselves, the operational logic of not 
doing so is rooted in their resources, for instance, an efficient 
capital structure. 
Table 3. Bargaining power of the financers due to the provider’s reliance on 
the financial integrator 
Representative Quotations  
“When it comes to third-world countries, the developing countries, there the 
requirements for financers have increased significantly. So, it does not 
depend on the country that much, but rather on the financer facet.” 
“But, we, we do not want to own it (the power plant) because there will be… 
The owners don’t want this on the balance sheet. Because it is an awful 
burden if Alpha placed a hundred power plants on their balance sheet.” 
 
On the other hand, regarding practices and understandings, 
the discrepancy favors the providers. In that respect, the 
bargaining power [5] of the provider increases. In the given 
context, practices and understandings refer to the investor’s 
lack of knowhow, resulting in a reliance on the providers. 
Nevertheless, the risk dimension of dependency [5], in the 
form of reliance, is not only a risk but also an asset. Due to 
the recognition of Alpha as a provider, the IPP’s undertaking 
may enjoy increased credibility in the eyes of their lenders, as 
the interview quotes in Table 4 demonstrate. 
Table 4. Customer’s reliance on provider’s capabilities 
Representative Quotations  
“Then, you should have a low-risk type of investment because you have a 
power plant price guaranteed by Alpha, and you will be guaranteed an 
operation contract, and that’s why this kind of business were started in the 
90s, to guarantee the operation cost to these investors. And you had also a 
financer normally involved, a bank which is financing this thing, and then 
you have owners which bought the shares in this special purpose company.” 
“And this very same calculation should be in the hands of the lender at that 
point when they ponder whether they should grant a loan to that fellow; is he 
going to generate earnings with his facility. So yeah, these are the kinds of 
models that turn engineering techniques into economics.” 
3.3. The logical relation of eOBCs and aOBCs 
The misalignment regarding the definition of eOBCs also 
transpires in our research. Grubic and Jennions [4] use the 
functionality of a product as the purchased attribute, whereas 
Böhm et al. define eOBCs as agreements constituting direct 
economic outcomes [12]. In the case of the IPP-provider 
relationship, both terms seem to apply. First, providers such 
as Alpha bill the customer by kWh; they thus sell the 
functionality of the power plant. However, although the 
contract is closely associated with the functional value of 
electricity, the outcome bought by the dispatching agent, in 
other words, the IPP, is the guaranteed value of their 
investment, as demonstrated in both Tables 1 and 2. Thus, the 
return on investment is to be ensured through servitization, 
i.e., the optimization of production based on dynamic market 
prices. Furthermore, in addition to the added servitization fees 
that allow the provider to capture additional value, the 
provider is also exposed to availability-related sanctions, 
which demonstrates the increased accountability. This issue is 
summarized below in Table 5. Thus, the deduction of an 
eOBC subsuming aOBCs, as presented by Grubic and 
Jennions [4], is verified in our case. Moreover, we argue that 
performance is, subsequently, subordinate to availability. The 
logic behind this reasoning was elaborately explicated by 
Alpha interviewees when asked about what kind of value their 
customer buys. 
Table 5. Economic value, availability and performance 
Representative Quotations  
“In a sense it is kind of “as-a-service”. So that there, from the power plant 
there will be this much coming out and if not, then it is on us.” 
“Well, of course there is certain a fixed monthly price, but in principal it 
depends on how much is produced. And there we have then bonuses and 
sanctions in place, so like availability and production penalties and else.” 
“In principle, you can summarize it to one word or two words, your choice. 
Availability. And then, the other one is performance. But the availability is 
the most important, without it, it does not work. It has no significance, what 
the performance without it is, or would be. So, you could say that’s the most 
important.” 
3.4. Discussion 
While the O&M agreements associated with the IPP 
contracts are extremely appealing to the providers due to their 
extensive scope (e.g., the customer is willing to outsource all 
the related operations), the asymmetry of the bargaining 
power fundamentally remains tilted in the direction of the 
IPPs. This result is despite the synergic effects of the 
provider’s recognition of the uses of sourcing. The reason for 
the given skewness gained support from both the literature 
and the interview data. The value driver of novelty in OBMs 
enables mutual strategic learning and the ability to develop 
competences outside the scope of one’s own activities during 
the long-term contract periods for stakeholders [7, 23]. 
Furthermore, and more pressingly, the lifecycle data that is 
gathered for utilization purposes thus becomes an issue with 
regard to rights and ownership. This is due to the learning 
activity of the customer, as elicited in Table 6. 
Table 6. The role of learning and data 
Representative Quotation  
Then, there is also this group who want to learn, and it means that the investor 
knows that they will be able to cut costs when they, at some point, start 
operating themselves. They basically want to gain access to the core. And 
there, we have a lot of examples, where the owner locates their own group on 
the site, and of course, it’s their property. You cannot restrict them there, they 
can monitor. They can watch and follow what we are doing, so they have this 
kind of five-year university, after which our prospects of continuing the 
operation agreement are fairly limited. But these are recognized issues in a 
sense, when the owner says they want their own office on the site, then we 
know it’s this kind of shorter operation project. This is one group.” 
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One apparent means for responding to the mentioned 
learning-enabled internalization is that the providers can 
develop capabilities to invest in the IPP to become capital 
shareholders. This finding conclusively verifies the existence 
of eOBCs in practice in accordance with the definition and 
example, where the outcome provider de facto condones 
incremental revenues based on the economic outcome [12]. 
The option is expounded upon by an Alpha interviewee in the 
table 7. 
Table 7. A gateway to shared incremental revenues 
Representative Quotation  
“We have a rule that we can own X percent of an IPP. But no more than that.” 
4. Conclusions 
4.1. Theoretical contribution 
Although seamless regarding the chosen RMT perspective, 
Grubic and Jennions [4] refer to Selviadris and Wynstra [3] to 
define outcomes as ‘the value derived by the customer from a 
given service or product.’ However, Grubic and Jennions use 
the definition of eOBC in a manner in which ‘the customer 
purchases the functional result of the product.’ Therefore, 
they diverge from the original eOBC definition provided by 
Böhm et al. [12] who define eOBCs as follows: ‘In contrast, 
when customers pay for economic results, the performance 
indicator is a monetary outcome variable, such as incremental 
revenues or profits.’ Thus, the term ‘functional result’ could, 
in this context, refer to any singular actions performed that 
lead to an outcome such as performed maintenance activities. 
In the context of the IPP-supplier relationship, the IPP 
ideally does not have to be concerned with such functional 
activities for two reasons. First, the IPP’s economic outcome 
(i.e., return on investment) is accounted for by the provider 
penalties compensating for the losses in case of production or 
availability failures. Second, the O&M agreement is based on 
output (i.e., kWh), while the fixed operational fees in a certain 
sense amount to a guarantee of a service-level agreement. 
Finally, the power purchasing agreement with the utilities 
ensures the continuous revenues, accounting for the return on 
investment. 
Conclusively, and in practice, the provider of the power 
plant or generation unit agrees to ensure the IPP the return for 
their investment at the risk of availability-related penalties. 
Furthermore, as suppliers have the option of owning a share 
of the IPP, thus making them a capital shareholder, which is 
justified by the incremental revenues, the given arrangement 
assuredly meets the definition of eOBC, as presented by 
Böhm et al. [12] while subsuming aOBCs that, together with 
performance values, ensure the fulfillment of the economic 
outcomes. 
Therefore, the value system at hand forms a triadic hub 
that shares interconnections with the provider, financial 
integrator and distributor, as presented in Figure 1. The given 
setting combines the intraorganizational microenvironments, 
thus making the figure an exciting area for the further 
examination of practices and other societal meanings. 
Furthermore, along with the shared goal of outcome 
achievement and an expanded microenvironment, the role of 
digital servitization, from the RMT perspective, for instance, 
becomes even more important and, thus, should be further 
studied.  
Figure 1. The ecosystem of an economic outcome-based contract 
4.2. Managerial implications 
The reason why the providers cannot sell the electricity 
themselves, although they retain the capabilities to do so, is 
simply that it would substantially burden their balance sheets. 
However, the given business model allows the providers to 
enjoy long-term O&M contracts, which furthermore enables 
cost optimization and thus marginal gains [30]. Additionally, 
and importantly, the providers have the option to invest in the 
IPPs, at least to some extent. The mentioned option allows for 
even greater alignment between the interests of the IPP and 
the supplier. Furthermore, IPPs can benefit from having the 
support of the provider while negotiating the PPAs and loans 
with utilities and financial institutions. Thus, formulating 
value propositions, with a focus beyond value chain micro-
level borders, is highly recommended for servitizing solution 
providers. 
In this paper, we found that eOBCs related to IPPs enable 
customers to create new competences that may eliminate the 
need for an outsourced operator. Consequently, it is vastly 
important for providers to develop strategies that enable the 
defense of the continuity of their advanced services. One 
plausible solution to the paradox seems to be similarly 
developing financial capabilities that allow for partnership 
agreements in the IPP context through capital investment. 
Some perspectives, on the other hand, emphasize developing 
customer autonomy-management capabilities [2], but 
ultimately, this will only mean fighting the inevitable. 
Therefore, rather than striving to maintain the extensive scope 
of delivery, we recognize the need to focus on the particular 
pockets of value creation that will create the dimensions for 
profit sharing. 
We mean that, although the providing company moves 
beyond products and singular actions in the value chain, the 
resources and core competences eventually facilitate the 
development of a competitive advantage for it. For example, 
although customers may be able to learn the best practices, 
resulting in optimal economic outcomes, their total cost of 
ownership is still dependent on the providers’ high-quality 
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spare parts and, more importantly, availability. This kind of 
knowledge about the installed base and inventories is 
something very inimitable and thus is a potential value driver 
for competitive advantage. Importantly, simultaneously using 
various business model configurations has been proven to 
hold potential for complementarity, rather than conflicting 
effects [31]. Therefore, instead of merely applying service-
dominant logic towards their servitizing operations [21], the 
managers in the servitized manufacturing companies engaged 
in outcome-based contracting, should explore the possibilities 
emerging from product-dominant logic as well.  
4.3. Limitations 
Although throughout this paper we criticized the prior 
assumptions made concerning the existence of eOBCs, we 
scrutinized the phenomena using entirely different theoretic 
lenses. The criticism of this article, however, concerned the 
definitive terminology and its interpretation. Thus, the RMT 
perspective could be applied in the case of IPPs, to falsify or 
expand the generalizability of the paper and to investigate its 
role as a part of digital servitization in the given context. 
Second, this study focused on the perspective of the providers. 
Expanding the scope of focality to also cover the perceptions 
of IPPs and utilities/grids might elicit a prolific area for the 
further investigation of this extreme case of servitizing 
ecosystems. 
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